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Abstract:  
Using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey we first document that the recent increase 
in income inequality in the US has not been accompanied by a corresponding rise in 
consumption inequality. Much of this divergence is due to different trends in within-group 
inequality, which has increased significantly for income but little for consumption. We then 
develop a simple framework that allows us to analytically characterize how within-group 
income inequality affects consumption inequality in a world in which agents can trade a full 
set of contingent consumption claims, subject to endogenous constraints emanating from the 
limited enforcement of intertemporal contracts (as in Kehoe and Levine, 1993). Finally, we 
quantitatively evaluate, in the context of a calibrated general equilibrium production 
economy, whether this set-up, or alternatively a standard incomplete markets model (as in 
Ayiagari 1994), can account for the documented stylized consumption inequality facts from 
the US data. 
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  1 Introduction
The sharp increase in earnings and income inequality for the US in the last 25 years is a well-
documented fact. Many authors have found that the dispersions of US household earnings and
incomes havea strong upward trend, attributable to increases in thedispersion ofthepermanent
component of income as well as to an increase in the volatility of the transitory component of
income.2 If one is interested in the welfare impact of these changes, however, the distribution
of current income might not be a su¢cient statistic. Since a signi…cant fraction of variations
of income appear to be due to variations in its transitory component, current income may not
be the appropriate measure of lifetime resources available to agents; and thus the distribution
of current income might not measure well how economic welfare is allocated among households
in the US.3 Moreover the same change in current or permanent income inequality might have
a very di¤erent impact on the welfare distribution, depending on the structure of credit and
insurance markets available to agents for smoothing income ‡uctuations. For these reasons
several authors have moved beyond income and earnings as indicators of well-being and have
studied the distribution of individual or household consumption. Contributors include Cutler
and Katz(1991a,b), Johnson and Shipp (1991), JohnsonandSmeeding (1998), MayerandJencks
(1993), Slesnick (1993, 2001), Deaton and Paxson (1994), Dynarski and Gruber (1997), Blundell
and Preston (1998) and Krueger and Perri (2004).
Our paper follows this line of research and aims at making three contributions, one em-
pirical, one theoretical and one quantitative in nature. On the empirical side it investigates
how the cross-sectional income and consumption distribution in the US developed over the pe-
riod 1980-2003. Using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, the paper extends and
complements the studies mentioned above. Our main …nding is that despite the surge in in-
come inequality in US in the last quarter of the century consumption inequality has increased
only moderately. In particular, income inequality has increased substantially both between and
within groupsof householdswith thesamecharacteristics(such as education, sex, race etc.) but,
even though between-group consumption inequality has tracked between-group income inequal-
2See, e.g., Gottschalk and Mo¢tt (1994), Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) or Katz and Autor (1998) for recent
surveys of these empirical …ndings.
3Blundell and Preston (1998) provide theoretical conditions under which the cross-sectional distribution of
current consumption is a su¢cient statistic for the cross-sectional distribution of welfare.
1ity quiteclosely, within-group consumption inequality hasincreased much lessthan within-group
income inequality.
Second, we propose a theoretical explanation for these stylized facts. It is our hypothesis
that an increase in the volatility of idiosyncraticlabor income (which we identify as the increase
in within-group inequality) has not only been an important factor in the increase in income
inequality, but has also caused a change in the development of …nancial markets, allowing indi-
vidual households to better insure against these (now bigger) idiosyncratic income ‡uctuations.
Wepresent a simplemodel with endogenous debt constraints (henceforth referred to as the debt
constraint model, DCM), building on earlier work by Alvarez and Jermann (2000), Kehoe and
Levine (1993, 2001) and Kocherlakota (1996) that allows us to analytically characterize the re-
lationship between within-group income and consumption inequality. In the model agents enter
risk sharing contracts, but at any point of time have the option to renege on their obligations,
at the cost of losing their assets and being excluded from future risk sharing. Our main result is
that an increase in the volatility of income, keeping the persistence of the income process con-
stant, always leads to a smaller increase in consumption inequality within the group that shares
income risk, unless there is no capital income in the economy. There is a nondegenerate range
of income dispersion such that an increase in income volatility leads to a decline in consumption
inequality. Intuitively, higher income volatility increases the value of risk sharing opportunities,
and therefore reduces the incentives to default. As a consequence, more risk sharing is possible
and the consumption distribution fans out less than the income distribution (and may even
“fan in”). This model captures, in a simple and analytically tractable way, the idea that the
structure of the credit markets in an economy is endogenous and that, in response to higher
income volatility, credit markets have more value and thus will tend to deepen.4
Finally, we assess whether an extension ofthis simplemodel is quantitatively consistent with
the stylized facts established in the empirical section of the paper. We develop a production
economy with capital and a large number of agents that face a stochastic labor income process.
We choose this income process to match the level and trend of income inequality, both between
4The endogenous response of credit markets to income risk has interesting policy implications. In Krueger
and Perri (1999) we show that in the DCM model public insurance (unemployment insurance, progressive taxes
etc.) may crowd out private insurance, possibly more than one-for-one. Empirical studies by Cutler and Gruber
(1996) and Albarran and Attanasio (2003) …nd a sizeable crowding-out e¤ect of public insurance programs.
2and within di¤erent groups. In particular, we also allow for changes in income inequality that
are not due to changes in income volatility. The extent to which agents can borrow to insulate
consumption from idiosyncratic income ‡uctuations is derived endogenously. It is a function
of the volatility of the stochastic income process, which, as before in the simple model, a¤ects
the incentives to repay loans by determining how valuable future access to credit markets is.
Our model, for a given time series of cross-sectional income distributions produces a time series
of cross-sectional between and within-group consumption distributions. We also evaluate the
quantitative implications for within and between-group consumption inequality of a standard
incomplete markets model (henceforth referred to as SIM model) along the lines of Aiyagari
(1994). We…ndthat theDCM model slightly understates theincreasein consumption inequality
while the SIM model somewhat overstates that increase, relative to the data.
The paper is organized asfollows. In Section 2 wedocument our main stylized facts. Section
3 presents the simple model while section 4 lays out the economy we use for the quantitative
analysis. Section 5 describes our quantitative experiment and parameter choices and section 6
presentsand discusses theresults. Section 7 concludes. Appendix A containsmore details about
the data and appendix B more details about computational issues.
2 Trends in Income and Consumption Inequality
In this section we document how income and consumption inequality have evolved in the US
during the last 25 years. For this purpose we use the Consumer Expenditure (CE) Interview
Survey, which is the only micro-level data set for the US that reports comprehensive measures
of consumption expenditures and earnings for a repeated large cross section of households.5
2.1 The Consumer Expenditure Survey
The CE Interview Survey is a rotating panel of households which are selected to be represen-
tative of the US population. It started in 1960 but continuous data are available only from the
…rst quarter of 1980 until the …rst quarter of 2004. Each quarter the survey contains detailed
information on quarterly consumption expenditures for all households interviewed during that
5The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) reports both income and consumption data. The consumption
data, however, contains only food consumption and therefore is of limited use for our analysis.
3quarter. After a …rst preliminary interview each household is interviewed for a maximum offour
consecutive times. In the second and …fth interview household members are asked questions
about earnings, other sources of income, hours worked and taxes paid for the past year.
2.2 Income and Consumption
Our measureof income is meant to capture all sources of household revenues that areexogenous
(to a large extent) to the consumption and saving decisions of households (which is endogenous
in ourmodels). Thereforewede…neincomeaslaborearningsaftertaxes plustransfers (fromnow
on LEA+ income). Wemeasure aftertaxes labor earningsasthe sum ofwages and salaries ofall
household members plus a …xed fraction of self-employment farm and non-farm income6 minus
reported federal, state and local taxes (net of refunds) and social security contributions. We
then add reported government transfers (unemployment insurance, food stamps and welfare).
Ourmeasureofconsumptionis meant to capturethe‡ow ofconsumptionservicesthat accrue
to ahouseholdin a given period. Fornon-durableorsmall semi-durablegoods as well asservices,
expenditures are a good approximation for that ‡ow. For large durable goods such as cars and
houses the relation between current expenditures and consumption service ‡ows is less direct.
Thus we impute service ‡ows from the (value of the) stock of durables of a household. Our
measure of service ‡ows from housing is the rent paid by the households who indeed rent their
homeandtheself-reported(by theCE respondent) hypothetical rent by thehouseholdswhoown.
Our measureofservice ‡ows of carsis a …xed fraction (1/32) of thevalue of thestock ofvehicles
owned by the household. Since we do not have direct information on the value of the stock of
cars we follow closely the procedure used by Cutler and Katz (1991a) and use information from
households who currently purchase vehicles (and for which we therefore observe thevalue of the
purchase) to imputethevalueof thestock ofvehiclesforall households. Ourbenchmark measure
of a households’ consumption is then thesum ofexpenditures on nondurables, servicesand small
durables (such us household equipment) plus imputed services from housing and vehicles. Each
expenditurecomponent is de‡ated by expenditure-speci…c, quarter-speci…cCPI’s. From now on
we label this benchmark measure ND+ consumption.7
6The exact fraction is 0.864 and is taken from Diaz Jimenez, Quadrini and Rios Rull (1996).
7In the data appendix we provide a detailed description of all the items included in our consumption measures
and of our imputation and de‡ation procedures.
4As we are interested in the distribution of resources per capita, before computing inequality
measure we divide household income and consumption by the number of adult equivalents in
the household using the Census equivalence scale (see Dalaker and Naifeh, 1998).
2.3 Sample Selection
Our objective is to characterize the link between labor income and consumption inequality.
Therefore we want to select a benchmark sample of households for which we have both reliable
labor incomeand consumption data for the same time interval. Wethereforerestrict our sample
to households that are complete income respondents8 and interviewed for four times. For these
householdsincomemeasuredinthe…fthinterview andthesumofconsumption…guresreported in
thesecond through the …fth interview are our measures oftheiryearly incomeand consumption.
For comparability with previous inequality studies we performed additional sample selections,
such as excluding elderly households, rural households and households whose reference person
reports an implausibly low real wage.9
In table A2 in the appendix we report the benchmark sample sizes for every year, along
with weighted averages for income and consumption. Note that the data display no growth of
expenditures on nondurables over time, as Slesnick (2001) already highlights. This is puzzling
since aggregate non-durable consumption expenditures from the NIPA show signi…cant growth
(see again Slesnick, 2001). This might be a signal for growing underreporting of non-durable
consumption expenditures in the CE. Also note, however, that ND+ consumption includes ser-
vices from durables which, on average, are almost as large as expenditures on non-durables (see
again table A2) and display a growth trend over time that matches up better with NIPA data.
So if underreporting ofconsumption exists, it is likely to be less severe for our benchmark ND+
consumption measure than for the more commonly used non-durable consumption expenditure.
2.4 Inequality Trends
Figure 1 displays the trend for four commonly used measures of cross-sectional inequality, com-
puted on the benchmark sample and on the measures of income and consumption described
8The CE classi…es as incomplete income respondents those households who report zero income for all the major
income categories, suggesting non-reliability of their earning …gures.
9See appendix A for a precise list of our sample restrictions.
5above. All measures arecomputed using CE population weights. We report the Gini coe¢cient,
the variance of the logs, and the 90/10 and 50/10 ratios. In each panel the solid line represents
inequality in LEA+ income while the dashed line represents inequality in ND+ consumption.
Finally the thin dash-dotted lines are standard errors of the inequality measures, computed by
performing a bootstrap procedure with 100 repetitions.
Figure 1 con…rms the well-known fact that labor income inequality in the US has increased
signi…cantly in the last quarter of the century: the Gini index has risen from around 0.3 to
around 0.37 while the variance of the logs displays an increase of more than 20%. The 90/10
ratio for incomesurgesfrom around 4.2 to over 6, suggesting a large divergencebetween thetwo
tails of the income distribution over time. Finally the 50/10 ratio displays an increase from 2.2
to about 2.7, revealing that households in the bottom tail of the income distribution have lost
ground relative to the median.10
The …gurealso presents ourmain empirical …nding, namely that the increasein consumption
inequality has been much lessmarked;11 the increasehas been from 0.23 to 0.26 for the Gini and
about 5% in the variance of logs. The 90/10 has increased from 2.6 to around 2.9 suggesting a
much more moderate fanning+out of the consumption distribution.12 Finally the 50/10 ratio
increases only from about 1.7 to 1.9 suggesting that, in terms of consumption, households in the
bottom part of the distribution have lost less ground relative to the median.13
Note that our income de…nition includes government taxes and transfers, so that changes
in government income redistribution policies cannot be responsible for the divergence between
the two series. Although the evolution of consumption inequality has been studied less than
the evolution of income inequality, some authors (Cutler and Katz 1991a,b and Johnson and
Shipp, 1991) have noted that the sharp increase in income inequality of the early 80’s has been
accompanied by an increase in consumption inequality. Our measures also display an increase
10Increases of similar magnitude are found in other cross-sectional data sets. Krueger and Perri (2004) compare
the increase in wage inequality using CE data with that obtained by using PSID data (from Heathcote et al.,
2003) and the increase measured by using CPS (from Katz and Autor, 1999) and …nd that, for the same sample
selection, the magnitude of the increase is very similar. This suggests that the quality of the CE earnings/wage
data is comparable to those of other cross-sectional data sets.
11Pendakur (1998) …nds similar results for Canada for 1978-1992 and his preferred measure of consumption.
12One nice property of the 90/10 ratios is that they are not sensitive to changes in top-coding thresholds. The
divergence of the 90/10 ratios in income and consumption thus suggests that changes in top-coding threshold
plays no important role in explaining the measured divergence in inequality.
13These …ndings are consistent with those of Slesnick (2001) who found that poverty rates for income increased
from 11.1% in 1973 to 13.8% in 1995, while poverty rates for consumption declined from 9.9% to 9.5%.
6in consumption inequality in the early 80’s, but, as it has been noted by Slesnick (2001) it is
less marked than the increase in income inequality; moreover in the 1990s income inequality
has continued to rise (although at a slower pace) while consumption inequality has remained
substantially ‡at. This last fact has also been reported by FED chairman Greenspan (1998)
in his introductory remarks to a symposium on income inequality. Attanasio and al. (2005)
have recently looked at consumption distributions using the CE Diary survey which surveys
a di¤erent group of households and which collects information on consumption of small items
frequently purchased such as food and personal care items. They …nd that for comparable
categories in the Diary and Interview Surveys mean per capita consumption is very similar but
consumption inequality grows more in the Diary Survey. Based on this …nding they construct
a measure of variance of log of non-durable consumption that uses information both from the
Diary and Interview Survey and …nd that it increases of about 4.6% over the period 1986-
2000. By contrast our measure, based solely on the interview survey, displays increase of about
2.5%. These increases in inequality are di¤erent but they are both signi…cantly smaller than
the increase in varianceof log income (which over the same period was over 12%). Moreover we
conjecture that, due to its limited consumption coverage, the impact of using the Diary Survey
is likely to be even smaller if one focuses on a broader de…nition of consumption such as our
benchmark ND+consumption. In thenext subsection wecheck therobustness ofthetrends just
described to alternative de…nitions of consumption and to alternative sample selection choices.
2.5 Alternative De…nitions and Samples
Panel (a) of table 1 reports the increase in consumption inequality (measured as the variance
of logs) from the …rst two years of our sample (1980-81) to the last two (2002-2003) obtained
for de…nitions of consumption expenditures. As a reference point in the …rst two columns we
again report the increase in inequality for our benchmark measures of income (LEA+) and
consumption (ND+).14 The third and fourth column report the increase in inequality in food
consumption and non-durable consumption (this is the de…nition of consumption used by At-
tanasio and Davis, 1996 among others). For these de…nitions of consumption the increase in
14In the reminder of the paper we focus on the variance of logs as our main measure of inequality. Therefore in
table 1 we restrict attention to this measure. Using other measures of inequality yield similar results.
7inequality is slightly smaller than for our benchmark consumption (ND+) measure. Finally
the last column of panel (a) reports the change in inequality for total consumption expendi-
tures (TCE). For this de…nition the increase in consumption inequality is larger, although still
less than half of the increase in income inequality. One should keep in mind, however, that
this consumption measure includes cash payments for homes and vehicles, and therefore con-
tain a signi…cant part of households’ savings, which biases measured consumption inequality
towards measured income inequality. In addition, this measure, being based on expenditures on
durablesratherthan on service ‡ows from these durables, is a¤ected by changes in the frequency
of durable purchases over time. For these reasons we think of the latter statistic as an upper
bound for the true change in consumption inequality rather than as the best estimate of it.
Table 1. Changes in inequality
(a) Alternative de…nitions
Income Consumption
LEA+ ND+ Food ND TCE
Change in Var. log. 21.4% 5.3% 2.3% 3.3% 10.4%
(b) Alternative samples
Benchmark Quarterly Inc. Rural Inc. Low Wages
Change in Var. log LEA+ 5.3% 6.3% 4.5% 5.5%
Change in Var. log ND+ 21.4% 22.0% 20.5% 27.5%
Panel (b) of Table 1 reports the increase in LEA+ income and ND+ consumption inequal-
ity, computed using di¤erent sample selections. The …rst column contains the results for our
benchmark sample. In the second column (labeled Quarterly) we report inequality measures
computed by using quarterly consumption measures (as opposed to yearly measures). These
numbers also use information from households that are interviewed in the CE less than four
times, thus increasing the sample size signi…cantly.15 It has the disadvantage, however, that,
for any given household, income and consumption information do not refer to the same period.
The third and fourth column report measures for samples which include rural households and
households with a reference person reporting a very low wage. We observe that with all sample
15In our benchmark sample we have an average of 6660 quarter/household data points per year while in the
quarterly sample there are on average 11300 quarter/household data points per year.
8selection criteria employed the increase in consumption inequality is quite similar and much
smaller than the increase in income inequality.16
2.6 Between and Within-Group Income and Consumption Inequality Trends
Before turning to the theoretical explanation for the empirical …ndings it is helpful to further
investigate the nature of the change in income and consumption inequality by decomposing
them in between- and within-group inequality. Between-group inequality is the inequality that
is attributable to …xed (and observable) characteristics of the household (for example educa-
tion, experience, sex). Although between-group inequality changes over time (returns to these
characteristics can change over time, as in the case of the increase in the college premium) it
is unlikely that households can insure against these changes; thus increases in between-group
inequality should translate into similar increases in between-group consumption inequality.
Within-group income inequality instead is a residual measure that also includes inequality
caused by idiosyncratic income shocks. Therefore increases in within-group income inequality
are (at least partly) attributable to increase in the volatility of idiosyncratic income shocks. In
the models discussed in the next sections the main question is how well households can insulate
their consumption from an increase in the volatility of these idiosyncratic income shocks. The
better households can insure against these shocks the less we expect within-group consumption
inequality to increase in responseto an increase in within-group income inequality. Thereforewe
now empirically measure the changes in both within-group income and consumption inequality
The empirical decomposition we employ is simple and commonly used. Following Katz and
Autor (1999), for each labor income and consumption expenditure cross-section (after control-
ling for age e¤ects) we regress income and consumption on the following characteristics of the
reference person and the spouse (if present): sex, race, years of education, experience, interac-
tion terms between experience and education, dummies for managerial/professional occupation
and region of residence. These characteristics explain about 25% of the cross sectional varia-
tion of income and consumption in 1980. We denote the cross sectional variance explained by
these characteristics as “between-group” inequality and the residual variance as “within-group”
16We also experimented with per-household (as opposed to per-adult-equivalent) income and consumption
measures and with di¤erent equivalence scales. These changes a¤ect the level of inequality measures but have
very little e¤ect on the trends.
9inequality. By construction the two variances sum to the total variance.
Figure 2 shows theevolution ofbetween-group (panel a) and within-group (panel b) inequal-
ity forincome and consumption. As documented by many studies, forincome both the between-
and within-group components display an increase. Panel (a) shows that for consumption the
between-group component displays an increase similar in magnitude to that of income.17 Panel
(b) revealsa very di¤erent picturefor the within-group component: theincrease in consumption
inequality is an order ofmagnitudesmaller than theincreasein incomeinequality. Consequently,
understanding the trends in panel (b) is crucial for understanding the patterns of income and
consumption inequality in the US.
In the next section we present a simple model in which we analytically characterize the
relation between income and consumption inequality within a group of ex-ante identical agents
and show how the endogenous expansion of risk sharing may lead to a small increase (or even a
decline) in within-group consumption inequality in the wake of increasing income inequality.
3 A Simple Model
We analyze a pure exchange economy similar to Kocherlakota (1996), Alvarez and Jermann
(2000) andKehoeand Levine(2001). Time isdiscrete and thenumberof time periods isin…nite.
There are two (types of) agents i = 1;2 and a single, nonstorable consumption good in each
period. There are two sources from which agents obtain endowments of the consumption good,
labor and capital “income”. This distinction, while not necessary in the simple model, helps to
explain our quantitative results in the next section. First, an agent receives endowments in the
form of stochastic labor income. If one consumer has labor income 1+", the other has 1¡"; so
that the aggregate endowment from labor is constant at 2 in each period. Let st 2 S = f1;2g
denote the consumer that has labor income 1+". We assume that fstg1
t=0 is a sequence of i:i:d
random variables with ¼(st = 1) = ¼(s2 = 2) = 1
2; so that households are ex ante identical.
Note that the parameter " 2 [0; 1) measures the variability of the income process.
In addition, thereare two trees, one initially owned by each agent, that each yield a constant
17This …nding is highly consistent with the results by Attanasio and Davis (1996), which suggest that changes
in relative wages between education groups are fully re‡ected in consumption changes of these groups. We will
revisit this point below in our model-based quantitative exercise.
10endowment of rper period. Thus aggregateendowment from capital equals 2r; total endowment
per period is constant at 2(1+r) and the capital share is given by r
1+r:
Let st = (s0;: ::; st) denotean event history and ¼(st) the time0 probability ofevent history
st: An allocation c = (c1; c2) maps event histories st into consumption. Agents have preferences
representable by
U(ci) =(1¡¯)
1 X
t=0
X
st
¯t¼(st)u(ci
t(st))
where ¯ <1 and u is continuous, twice di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave on
(0;1) and satis…es the Inada condition limc!0 u0(c) =1. De…ne as
U(ci;st) =(1¡¯)
1 X
¿=t
X
s¿jst
¯¿¡t¼(s¿jst)u(ci
¿(s¿))
the continuation utility of agent i from allocation ci; from event history st onwards and denote
by e =(e1;e2) the autarkic allocation of consuming the labor endowment in each event history.
In this economy both agents have an incentive to share their endowment risk. We assume,
however, that at any point in time both agents have the option of reneging on the risk sharing
arrangement obligations and bearing the associated costs, speci…ed as exclusion from intertem-
poral tradeand lossofany treein theirpossession. Thisimpliesthat any risk sharing mechanism
must yield allocations that deliver to each consumer a continuation utility at least as high as the
autarkicallocation, forall historiesst: Formally, weimposetheindividual rationality constraints:
U(ci;st) ¸ U(ei) =(1 ¡¯)
1 X
¿=t
X
s¿jst
¯¿¡t¼(s¿jst)u(ei
¿(s¿)) 8i;st (1)
We say that an allocation (c1;c2) is constrained e¢cient if it satis…es the resource constraint
c1 +c2 =2(1 +r) (2)
and theindividual rationality constraints (1): AlvarezandJermann (2000) show how constrained
e¢cient allocations can be decentralized as competitive equilibria with state dependent borrow-
ing constraints. Now we study the cross-sectional consumption distribution associated with a
constrained e¢cient allocation; we are particularly interested in how this distribution changes
11in response to an increase in income volatility, as measured by ":
3.1 The Constrained E¢cient Consumption Distribution
Wefocus on symmetric allocations.18 In order to analyze how constrained e¢cient consumption
allocations vary with " we now solve for the continuation value of autarky, which is given by
U(1+") = (1¡¯)u(1 +") +
¯
2
[u(1+") +u(1 ¡")]
U(1¡") = (1¡¯)u(1 ¡") +
¯
2
[u(1+") +u(1 ¡")]
Here U(1 +") and U(1 ¡") denote the continuation utility of autarky for the agent with the
currently high income and the currently low income, respectively. The continuation utility from
autarky is a convex combination of utility obtained from consumption today, (1 ¡¯)u(1 +")
or (1 ¡¯)u(1 ¡") and the expected utility from tomorrow onwards. The next lemma, whose
proofis straightforward and hence omitted, states properties of U(1+"); as a function ofincome
variability ": De…ne UFB(r) = u(1+r) as the lifetimeutility ofthe …rst best allocation in which
there is complete risk sharing and consumption of both agents is constant at 1 +r:
Lemma 1 U(1+"); is strictly increasing in " at " =0; is strictly decreasing in " as " ! 1 and
is strictly concave in "; with a unique maximum "1 = argmax" U(1 +") 2 (0; 1): Furthermore:
1. Either U(1 +"1) ·UFB(r) or
2. U(1 +"1) > UFB(r): In this case there exist "(r) < 1 such that U(1 + "(r)) = UFB(r):
The number "(r) is strictly increasing in r: Furthermore, either there exists a number
¹ "(r) 2 ("(r);1) such that U(1 +¹ "(r)) =UFB(r) and the number ¹ "(r) is strictly decreasing
in r; or U(2) >UFB(r); in which case we take ¹ "(r) =1:
The non-monotonicity of U(1 +"); shown in Figure 3, stems from two opposing e¤ects. For
small " the direct e¤ect of higher consumption today outweighs the higher risk faced by the
agent from tomorrow onward and U(1 +") increases with ". As " becomes larger and future
18Consider two histories s
t; ~ s
t that satisfy, for all ¿ · t
s¿ = 1 if and only if ~ s¿ = 2:
A consumption allocation is symmetric if c
1
t(s
t) = c
2
t(~ s
t) for all such histories s
t; ~ s
t:
12consumption more risky, U(1+") declines with "; as the risk e¤ect dominates the direct e¤ect.
On the other hand, the value of autarky for the agent with currently low income, U(1 ¡"); is
strictly decreasing (and concave) in " (as also plotted in Figure3), since an increase in " reduces
consumption today for this agent and makes it more risky from tomorrow onwards.
Using these properties of the continuation utilities from autarky and the results by Alvarez
and Jermann (2000) and Kehoe and Levine (2001) (in particular their proposition 5) one imme-
diately obtains the following characterization of the consumption distribution for this economy.
Proposition 2 The constrainede¢cientsymmetric consumption distribution is completely char-
acterized by a number "c(") ¸ 0. Agents with labor income 1+" consume 1+r+"c(") and agents
with labor income 1 ¡" consume 1 +r ¡"c("). The number "c(") is the smallest non-negative
solution of the following equation
U(1 +r+"c(")) = max(UFB(r);U(1 +")) (3)
and U(1 +r +"c(")) is the lifetime utility of the consumption allocation characterized by "c(")
The intuition for this result is simple: in any e¢cient risk-sharing arrangement thecurrently
rich agent has to transfer resources to the currently poor agent. To prevent this agent from
defaulting she needs to be awarded su¢ciently high current consumption in order to be made
at least indi¤erent between the risk-sharing arrangement and the autarkic allocation. The
propositionsimply statesthat thee¢cient consumptionallocation featuresmaximal risk sharing,
subject to providing the currently rich agent with su¢cient incentives not to walk away.
Note that if UFB(r) ¸ U(1 +") the smallest solution to equation (3) is "c(") = 0 and the
constrained e¢cient allocation implies full risk sharing. This also implies that, since the value
of complete markets is strictly increasing in capital income r; a higher r expands the region of
incomedispersions "forwhich perfect risk sharing isfeasible and thus constrained e¢cient. Also
note that, unless r =0; autarky is never constrained e¢cient, since the equation
U(1 +r+"c(")) =U(1 +")
is never solved by "c(") ="; unless r =0:
133.2 Income Variability and Consumption Inequality
We now characterize how the constrained e¢cient consumption distribution varies with the
variability of income, ": Remember that "1 was de…ned as unique maximizer of U(1+"):
Proposition 3 Fix ¯ 2 (0;1) and r ¸ 0:
1. If U(1 + "1) · UFB(r); then perfect consumption insurance is feasible for all " and a
change in " has no e¤ect on consumption inequality.
2. If U(1+"1) >UFB(r) then for " 2 [0; "(r)) and " 2 [¹ "(r);1) perfect consumption insurance
is feasible and a marginal increase in " has no e¤ect on consumption inequality. If " 2
["1; ¹ "(r)) a marginal increase in " leads to a reduction in consumption inequality, whereas
for " 2 ["(r);"1) a marginal increase in " increases consumption inequality. If r > 0; the
increase in consumption inequality is strictly smaller than the increase in income inequality.
The proof of this proposition follows immediately from proposition 1 and the properties
of U(1 + ") stated in Lemma 1; apart from the very last part. The fact that consumption
inequality always increases less than income inequality is obvious for the regions " 2 [0;"(r))
and " 2 [¹ "(r);1) and" 2 ["1;¹ "(r)), sincein theseregions consumptioninequality does not change
or is even declining in income volatility. For the region " 2 ["1;¹ "(r)) we have
U(1 +r+"c(")) =U(1 +")
and thus by the implicit function theorem
d"c(")
d"
=
U0(1 +")
U0(1 +r+"c("))
2 (0; 1)
since U(:) is strictly concave, and e¢cient risk sharing implies r+"c(") <" for r > 0:
Figure 3 provides some intuition for the proposition above. In the top panel we plot the
value of autarky in the two states, the value of full risk sharing and U(1+r +"), while in the
bottom panel we plot income and consumption dispersion, as a function of income dispersion ":
From the top panel we see that for " 2 [0; "(r)) and " 2 [¹ "(r); 1); UFB(r) > U(1 +") and
thus the …rst best allocation can be implemented. In this case, as shown in the bottom panel,
14consumption inequality does not vary with income inequality.
Suppose now that "1 <" <¹ "(r). For example, consider the point " = "a on the x-axis; from
proposition 1 the constrained e¢cient consumption allocation is given by the smallest solution
to U(1 +r + "c("a)) = U(1 +"a). The top panel of …gure 3 displays the solution "c("a): In
this allocation, which involves partial risk sharing as "c("a) < "a , the agent with high income
receives a continuation utility equal to the value of autarky, while the agent with low income
receives U(1 +r ¡"c("a); strictly higher than its value of autarky (U(1 ¡"a)). In this range a
marginal increase in income inequality reduces the value of autarky for the high-income agent
and lesscurrent consumption is required to makehernot default ("c("a) moves to the left). This
reduces consumption dispersion in the economy, as shown in the bottom panel of the …gure.
Finally, in the range "(r) < " < "1 (consider for example the point " = "b in the …gure) the
constrained e¢cient allocation is characterized by "c("b): In this case a marginal increase in "
increases the value of autarky for the constrained agent and so her current consumption has to
increase to prevent her from defaulting: consumption inequality increases.
To summarize, in thisenvironment with limited commitment anincreaseofincomedispersion
always leads to a smaller increase in consumption dispersion as long as there is some capital
income. It may even lead to a reduction is consumption dispersion. The intuition behind these
resultsisthat an increasein incomeinequality, by makingexclusionfromfuturerisk sharingmore
costly, renders the individual rationality constraint less binding. It thereby allows individuals
to share risk to a larger extent and thus reduces ‡uctuations in their consumption pro…les. It
is crucial for this result that income shocks are not perfectly permanent (although they may
be highly persistent), because it is the fear of being poor again in the future that makes a
currently rich agent transfer resources to his currently poor brethren.19 This analysis suggests
that the endogenous evolution of (formal, market-based and informal) risk-sharing mechanisms
canindeed generateamodestly increasing oreven declining within-group consumptioninequality
despite a substantially increasing within-group income inequality.
19It is straightforward to generalize our results to a serially correlated endowment process. An increase in
persistence leads to an increase in consumption dispersion in the constrained e¢cient consumption distribution.
This increase is strict if initially there is some, but not complete risk sharing. For a proof of this result, see Kehoe
and Levine (2001). The intuition is again simple: the value of autarky for the agent with high current income
increases (as the agent is more likely to have high income in the future with higher persistence), which makes the
individual rationality constraint more stringent and leads to less transfers to the poor agent being sustainable.
153.3 Capital Income and the Extent of Risk Sharing
Finally we show how theextent of risk sharing depends on how abundant capital income r. Since
we will study a production economy with capital in our quantitative exercise, it is instructive
to provide some intuition for how the presence (and magnitude) of capital income a¤ects the
extent to which households can share risk. We …nd that risk sharing is increasing in r; strictly
so if risk sharing is not perfect (we already argued above that the region of " for which perfect
risk sharing obtains is strictly larger the larger is r).
Proposition 4 Let "c(";r) characterize the constrained e¢cient consumption allocation, as a
function of capital income r: Then if ^ r >r; we have
"c("; ^ r) ·"c(";r)
for all " 2 (0;1); with inequality the strict if and only if "c(";r) >0: That is, more risk sharing
is possible with capital income ^ r than with r:
Proof. The only-if part is obvious, since 0 · "c("; ^ r) < "c(";r): For the if part, if "c("; ^ r) = 0
the result follows. So suppose "c("; ^ r) >0: Then
U(1 +^ r +"c("; ^ r)) =U(1 +") (4)
But if "c("; ^ r) ¸ "c("; r) >0 (perfect risk sharing at r is impossible since the perfect risk sharing
region is smaller at r than at ^ r); then we obtain a contradiction since
U(1 +") =U(1 +r+"c(";r)) < U(1 +^ r+"c(";r)) · U(1+ ^ r+"c("; ^ r)) = U(1+"): (5)
In the next section we evaluate the quantitative importance of the mechanism of extended
consumption insurance due to a relaxation of default constraints just described. For this we
employ a production economy with a continuum of agents which face a more realistic income
process than in the simple model; in particular, we will also allow for changes in between-group
inequality.
164 The Model with Large Number of Agents
4.1 The Environment
There is a single good that is being produced in a given period, which can be used for consump-
tion or investment in the physical capital stock K: The representative …rm produces output
according to a Cobb-Douglas production technology Y = AK®L1¡®; where L denotes the ho-
mogeneous labor input and A is a technology parameter. The aggregate resource constraint
reads as
Ct+Kt+1 ¡(1 ¡±)Kt =AK®
t L1¡®
t (6)
with Ct denoting aggregateconsumption and ± denoting thedepreciationrateofphysical capital.
Laboris inelastically supplied by a continuum ofconsumers of measure1. Individualsbelong
to di¤erent groups i 2 f1;: :: Mg; with pi denoting the fraction ofthe population being in group
i: We interpret these di¤erent groups of agents as capturing heterogeneity in the population
with respect to …xed characteristics that a¤ect an individuals’ wage and therefore income, such
as education or sex. Since we documented above that an important part of the rise in income
inequality is due to increased between-group inequality, an incorporation of this type of hetero-
geneity appears is critical for any quantitative study of income and consumption inequality.
An individual of group i has a stochastic labor endowment process f®itytg where ®it is the
deterministic group-speci…c, possibly time-varying mean labor endowment and theidiosyncratic
component fytg follows a Markov process with …nite support Yt, a set with cardinality N. Since
labor income will be the product of individual labor endowment and an economy-wide wage per
e¢ciency unit of labor, we use the words labor endowment and labor income interchangeably.
Let ¼t(y0jy) denote the transition probabilities of the Markov chain, assumed to be identical for
all agents. Theset Yt andthe matrix ¼t are indexed by t sincewe allow for the idiosyncraticpart
of the income process to change over time. Furthermore we assume a law of large numbers, so
that thefraction ofagents facing shock y0 tomorrow with shock y today inthepopulation isequal
to ¼t(y0jy): Finally we assume that ¼0(y0jy) has a unique invariant measure ¦(:): Let denote
by yt the current period labor endowment and by yt = (y0; ::;yt) the history of realizations of
endowment shocks; also ¼(ytjy0) = ¼t¡1(ytjyt¡1)¢¢ ¢¼0(y1jy0): We intend the notation ysjyt to
mean that ys is a possible continuation of labor endowment shock history yt: We furthermore
17assume that at date 0 the measure over current labor endowments is given by ¦0(:). At date
0 agents are distinguished by their group i; their initial asset holdings (claims to period zero
consumption) a0 and by the their initial labor endowment shock y0. Let ©0 be the initial
distribution over types (i;a0;y0): Thus total labor supply is given by
Lt =
Z X
yt
®ityt¼(ytjy0)d©0; (7)
that is, by the sum of all labor endowments in the population. Finally, agents’ preferences are
exactly as described in the simple model of the previous section.
4.2 Market Structures
We now describethe market structure of two incompletemarkets economies whose quantitative
properties we will contrast with the stylized empirical facts established in Section 2.
4.2.1 Debt Constraint Markets (DCM)
An individual of type (i; a0;y0) starts with initial assets a0 and trades Arrow securities subject
to pre-speci…ed credit lines Ai
t(yt;yt+1) that are contingent on observable labor endowment
histories and an agents’ group, and whose exact form is speci…ed below. The prices for these
Arrow securitiesaredenoted by qt(yt;yt+1), and depend only onanagent’s own laborendowment
history and time, in order to re‡ect deterministic changes in the income process and hence in
the magnitude of labor endowments ®ityt.
Consider the problem of an agent of type i with initial conditions (i;a0; y0). The agent
chooses, conditional on his labor endowment history, consumption fct(a0; yt)g and one-period
Arrow securities fat+1(a0;yt;yt+1)g whose payo¤ is conditional on his own endowment realiza-
tion yt+1 tomorrow, to maximize, for given (a0;y0)
(1 ¡¯)
0
@u(c0(a0; y0)) +
1 X
t=1
X
ytjy0
¯t¼(ytjy0)u
¡
ct(a0;yt)
¢
1
A (8)
18s.t. ct(a0; yt) +
X
yt+1
qt(yt;yt+1)at+1(a0;yt;yt+1) = wt®ityt +at(a0;yt) 8yt (9)
at+1(a0;yt;yt+1) ¸ Ai
t+1(yt; yt+1) 8yt;yt+1 (10)
Here wt is the wage rate per e¤ective unit of labor.
Following Alvarez and Jermann (2000) we specify the short-sale constraints Ai
t(yt;yt+1) as
“solvency constraints” that are not too tight. As before let UAut
t (i; yt) denote the continuation
utility from autarky, given current laborendowment realization ®ityt: Given a sequence ofprices
fqtg1
t=0 and short-sale constraints fAi
t(yt; yt+1)g1
t=0; de…ne the continuation utility Vt(i;a;yt) of
an agent of type i with endowment shock history yt and current asset holdings a at time t as
Vt(i; a;yt) = max
fcs(a;ys);as+1(a;ys;ys+1)g
(1 ¡¯)
0
@u(ct(a; yt)) +
1 X
s=t+1
X
ysjyt
¯t¼(ysjyt)u(cs(a; ys))
1
A
subject to (9)and (10): Short-sale constraints fAi
t(yt;yt+1)g1
t=0 arenot “too tight” ifthey satisfy
Vt+1(i;Ai
t+1(yt; yt+1);yt+1) =UAut
t+1(i; yt+1) for all (yt;yt+1): (11)
That is, the constraints are such that an agent of type i; having borrowed up to maximum,
at+1(a; yt; yt+1) =Ai
t+1(yt;yt+1) isindi¤erent betweenrepaying his debt anddefaulting, with the
default consequence being speci…ed as limited future access to …nancial markets. In contrast to
thesimple model, we now allow households to at least save after default, at a state-uncontingent
interest rate rd (a parameter of the model). The value of autarky is then given by
UAut
t (i;yt) = max
fcs(a0;ys);bs+1(a0;ys)g
(1 ¡¯)
0
@u(ct(a0;yt)) +
1 X
s=t+1
X
ysjyt
¯t¼(ysjyt)u(cs(a0; ys))
1
A
s.t. cs(a0; ys) +
bs+1(a0; ys)
1 +rd
= ws®isys +bs(a0; ys¡1) 8ys
bs+1(a0;ys) ¸ 0
and subject to bt(a0;yt¡1) =0: That is, the defaulting agent starts her life in …nancial autarky
with no assets, and can save(but not borrow) at the interest raterd: Forrd =¡1; the household
19would optimally neversave after default, and thusin this case the valueofautarky is determined
exactly as in the simple model above.
De…nition 1 Given ©0;K0; a competitive equilibrium with solvency constraints fAi
t(yt; yt+1)g
that are not too tight is allocations
©
ct(i;a0; yt);at+1(i;a0; yt; yt+1)
ª
for households, allocations
fKt; Ltg for the …rm, and prices fwt;rt; qt(yt; yt+1)g such that
1. (Household Optimization) Given prices, household allocations maximize (8) subject to (9)
and (10); and the solvency constraints are not “too tight” (in the sense of 11).
2. (Firm Optimization)
wt = (1¡®)A
µ
Kt
Lt
¶®
rt = ®A
µ
Kt
Lt
¶®¡1
¡±
3. (Market Clearing) Lt is given by (7); the goods market clearing condition (6) holds, with
Ct =
Z X
yt
ct(i; a0;yt)¼(ytjy0)d©0
and the asset market clearing condition holds
Kt+1 =
1
1+rt+1
Z X
yt
at+1(i; a0;yt;yt+1)¼(yt+1jy0)d©0 ´
At+1
1+rt+1
A stationary equilibrium is an equilibrium in which frt;wtg as well as the cross-sectional
asset- and consumption distributions are constant over time.
Two notes on the equilibrium de…nition: …rst, in the asset market clearing condition we
divide the right hand side by the interest rate since the Arrow securities are state contingent
zero coupon bonds. Second, no arbitrage implies that
qt(yt; yt+1) =
¼(yt+1jyt)
1+rt+1
because households have to be indi¤erent between saving with risk-freecapital or reconstructing
20and risk-free asset with the full set of Arrow securities (note that with the full set of Arrow
securities risk-free capital is a redundant asset for households, so we abstained from introducing
purchases of risk-free capital in the household problem explicitly). Physical capital in our econ-
omy is not important as an additional asset, but is important because it provides the economy
as a whole with an asset in positive net supply, and therefore a positive wealth-to-income ratio.
The simple model above demonstrated that the more abundant is capital (income), the better
is the extent of consumption insurance achievable in the DCM model.
Notice that the dispersion of the income process a¤ects the debt constraints and thus the
extent to which individual agents can borrow in exactly the same way it a¤ected the extent
of risk sharing in the simple model of Section 3. An increase in the dispersion of the income
process not only increases the necessity of extended borrowing to smooth consumption, but
also the possibility of extended borrowing, since the default option may become less attractive.
This e¤ect is the driving force behind our main quantitative result that an increase in the
cross-sectional dispersion of income may not lead to a signi…cant increase in cross-sectional
consumption inequality.
4.2.2 Standard Incomplete Markets (SIM)
We will compare our results to those obtained in a standard incomplete markets model, as in
Huggett (1993) or Aiyagari (1994). Let qin
t denote the price, at period t; of an uncontingent
claim to one unit of the consumption good in period t +1. The sequential budget constraints
the agent faces are
ct(a0; yt) +qin
t at+1(a0; yt) =wt®ityt +at(a0; yt¡1) (12)
and the short-sale constraints become
at+1(a0; yt) ¸¡®it ¹ B: (13)
The de…nition of equilibrium and stationary equilibrium for this economy is similar to the one
discussed above and hence omitted. Notice that the only di¤erence between the two economies
is the set of …nancial assets that are traded (a full set of contingent claims in the DCM model,
21only a singleuncontingent bond in theSIM model) and how the short-sale constraints that limit
these asset trades are speci…ed.
In order to compute calibrated versions of both economies we reformulate them recursively.
Notethat the computation of equilibrium in the DCM model requires us to solve for both prices
and borrowing constraints simultaneously(see Appendix B for the details)
5 The Quantitative Exercise
We now explain the quantitative exercise we carry out below. It involves the following steps.
1. We …rst choose parameter values so that the stationary equilibrium in both economies
matches key observations of the US economy in 1980’s. This applies, in particular, to the
deterministic and stochastic part of the labor productivity and thus income process.
2. We then introduce a …nite path of changes in the dispersion of the labor productivity
process to mimic the increase in income inequality observed in US data. We assume that
this change in the labor productivity process is unforeseen by agents, but that all future
changes in the process are fully learned once the …rst change occurred.
3. The change in the labor productivity process for a …nite number of periods induces a
transition in both models from the initial to a …nal stationary equilibrium associated with
the process that prevails once the change in that process has been completed.
4. Both models endogenously generate consumption distributions along the transition from
the old to the new steady state. We compute measures of consumption inequality for both
models and comparethem to theempirical facts established in Section 2. In order to carry
out these steps we now specify the parameters of both models.
5.1 Calibration
We need to choose a) technology parameters A; ±;®, b) preference parameters: ¯ and ¾ (the
coe¢cient of relative risk aversion in the CRRA utility function, c) the endowment process
f®itytg1
t=0 with yt 2 Yt and ®it 2 At, the transition matrices ¼t, and the group sizes pi, e) the
borrowing constraint ¹ B for the SIM model and the autarkicinterest rate rd for theDCM model.
225.1.1 Income Process
We takethe length of a model period to beoneyear. An individuals’ labor income eit = wt®ityt
consists of a common wage, a group-speci…c time-dependent deterministic part ®it; and an
idiosyncraticstochasticcomponent yt: In theempirical section wedecomposedindividual income
and consumption data into a group-speci…c and an idiosyncratic component. Our calibration
strategy follows the same approach. The logarithm of labor income is given by
ln(eit) =ln(wt) +ln(®it) +ln(yt):
and thus the cross-sectional variance of log-labor income is equal to
¾2
et =¾2
®t+¾2
yt
where¾2
et = Var[ln(eit)] ; ¾2
®t =Var[ln(®it)] and¾2
yt =Var[ln(yt)] : Weidentify f¾2
®t;¾2
ytg2003
t=1980
with thewithin- and between-group incomevariances plotted in…gure 2. We…rst HP-…lter(with
smoothing parameter of 400) the time series f¾2
®t; ¾2
ytg2003
t=1980, in order to remove high-frequency
variation in our empirical variances. We then choose parameters governing the model income
process so that a) in the initial stationary equilibrium both the between- and within-group in-
comevarianceofthemodel matchesthe…ltered data for theearly 80’sand b) along thetransition
trends in between- and within-group income variances are reproduced by the model.
5.1.2 Between-Group Income Inequality
We pick the number of groups to be 2 with equal mass pi = 0:5. For the initial stationary
equilibrium we choose the group-speci…c means as ®1 = e¡¾1980 and ®2 = e¾®1980: Similarly,
using ¾®2003 we obtain average group incomes for the …nal steady state, persisting from 2003
into the inde…nite future. For the transition path we then select f®1t;®2tg2003
t=1981 so that the
trend of between-group income inequality follows that in the data.
Since f®1t;®2tg1
t=1980 is a deterministic sequence, in the context of both models considered
in thispaper, the increase in between-group income inequality translates fully into an increase in
between-group consumption inequality. Furthermore, by construction, the change in between-
23group inequality does not a¤ect the quantitative importance of the risk-sharing mechanism at
work for within-group stochastic income variability described in Section 3.
We choose this speci…cation for two reasons. First, in an in‡uential paper Attanasio and
Davis (1996) show that between-group consumption insurance fails, and conclude that “the evi-
dence ishighly favorableto an extreme alternative hypothesis under which relative consumption
growth equals relative wage growth” (p. 1247). With our speci…cation of average group in-
come, changes in this income component are not (self-)insurable, consistent with their …ndings.
Second, we will be able to quantify exactly to what extent the (self-)insurance mechanisms of
both models can o¤set the increase in idiosyncratic income volatility. The potency of these
mechanisms depend on the properties of the idiosyncratic income process, discussed next.
5.1.3 Within-Group Income Variability
We model the idiosyncratic part of the income process, ln(yt); as the sum of a persistent and a
transitory component, as Storesletten et al. (1998, 2004) or Heathcote et al. (2004):
ln(yt) = zt +"t
zt = ½zt¡1 +´t: (14)
Here "t;´t are independent, serially uncorrelated and normally distributed random variables
with zero mean and variances ¾2
"t;¾2
´t; respectively. We explicitly allow these variances to
change over time, whereas we treat ½ as a time-invariant parameter. Note, however, that if
¾2
"t and ¾2
´t increase at di¤erent rates over time, the implied persistence of the idiosyncratic
component of income, ln(yt); changes. Thus the process we use is ‡exible enough to allow for
time-varying income persistence even if ½is constant over time. As benchmark value for ½ we
choose ½ = 0:9989; the value Storesletten et al. (2004) …nd when estimating the process in (14).
As sensitivity analysis we also report results for lower persistence parameters.
We now describe how, from our data on f¾2
ytg2003
t=1980 and conditional on the value of ½ we
identify the unobserved variance of the transitory part, ¾2
"t and the variance of the persistent
part, ¾2
zt (or equivalently ¾2
´t). The key statistics that allow us to identify ¾2
"t and ¾2
zt are the
observed cross-sectional within-group income variance ¾2
yt and the cross-sectional within-group
24income auto-covariance Cov(yt; yt+1), which, thanks to the short panel dimension of the CE
data, we can measure in our sample. The two identifying equations for (¾2
zt;¾2
"t) are easily
derived for our income process
Cov(yt; yt+1) =E((zt +"t)(½zt +´t+1 +"t+1)) =½¾2
zt (15)
and
¾2
yt =¾2
zt +¾2
"t (16)
Given ½; Cov(yt; yt+1) and ¾2
yt, the values for ¾2
zt and ¾2
"t are uniquely determined.
Equipped with time series for f¾2
"t; ¾2
ztg2003
t=1980 from the data we now specify a discretized
version of the process in (14). The purely transitory component, at period t with equal proba-
bility takes one of the two values f"1t;"2tg: By choosing "1t = ¡¾"t and "2t = ¾"t the transitory
shock fed into the model has a variance exactly as big as identi…ed in the data, for all time
periods. Finally, for the persistent part of the process we use a seven state Markov chain with
time-varying states and transition probabilities such that the variance of this process, in each
period, equals ¾2
zt as identi…ed from the data.20 Note that after 24 model periods (2003 in real
time) the change in the dispersion of the income process is completed. However, due to the en-
dogenous wealth dynamics in both models it may take substantially longer than these 24 years
for both economies to complete the transition to the new stationary consumption distribution.
To summarize, the income process fed into the model perfectly reproduces the empirically
identi…ed time series of between-group income variance ¾2
®t, within-group income variance due
to the transitory shock, ¾2
"t and due to the persistent shock, ¾2
zt: Figure 4 displays the original
and …ltered time series of these variances, identical for data and both models. We observe that
all three components increase substantially over time, contributing to the overall increase in
income inequality ¾2
yt. Of the overall increase of 18 percentage points in the variance of the
…ltered data, the change in the variance of between-group income accounts for 36%, 40% are
due to the persistent part and 24% due to the transitory part. Thus we con…rm Violante’s
(2002) …ndings that a signi…cant part of the increase in wage or earnings inequality is due to
20We employ the Tauchen procedure to discretize the AR(1) process. As inputs this procedure requires the
½ = 0:9989 (in the benchmark) and a (time-varying) variance ¾
2
´t: The variance ¾
2
´t was chosen in such a way
that the implied variance ¾
2
zt from the Markov chain matches its empirical observation from the data.
25bigger transitory shocks. The implied overall persistence of the idiosyncratic income process
ln(yt) = zt +"t is roughly constant over time, with a very slight decline.
5.1.4 Exogenous Borrowing Limit and Autarkic Interest Rate
As benchmark borrowing limit in the SIM model we set ¹ B = 1. Note that we normalize
endowment in such a way that this borrowing limit corresponds to a generous one times the
average annual income for each group i. In the DCM model as benchmark we allow households
to save at the initial equilibrium interest rate, rd = r in autarky. We then report how sensitive
our quantitative results are to the choice of the borrowing limit and the autarkic interest rate.
5.1.5 Technology and Preference Parameters
We assume that the period utility is logarithmic, u(c) =log(c): We then choose the technology
parameters (A;®; ±) so that in both models the initial steady state has a wage rate of 1 (a
normalization), a capital incomeshare of30% and a return on physical capital of 4% per annum,
as suggested in McGrattan and Prescott (2003). The time discount factor ¯ is then set in both
models such that theinitial steady statein both modelshas a capital (wealth) -to-output ratio of
2:6: This value is equal to theaverage wealth (including …nancial wealth and housing wealth) for
CE households in the benchmark sample in 1980-81 and it is also closeto the value estimated in
NIPA data by Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2002). Note that, conditional on the capital-
output ratio target the three technology parameters solve the three equations ®=0:3 and
r = 0:04 =®
Y
K
¡±
w = 1 = (1 ¡®)A
µ
K
N
¶®
=(1¡®)A
µ
r+±
®A
¶ ®
®¡1
which yields ± = 7:54% and A = 0:9637 in both models, since the production side of the
economy is identical in both. The appropriate choice of the time discount factor ¯ then insures
that households indeed have the incentive to save exactly the amount required to make the
capital-output ratio equal to 2:6: This requires a ¯ =0:959 for the DCM model and a ¯ = 0:954
for the SIM model. In our sensitivity analyses we always re-calibrate ¯ to maintain the same
26equilibrium capital-output ratio in the initial steady state.21
6 Quantitative Results
6.1 Benchmark Calibration
We now document the quantitative predictions of both models with respect to the evolution of
consumption inequality and compare them to thedata. Sincein our calibration we used …ltered
income variances as targets we also …lter the consumption inequality statistics to remove high
frequency ‡uctuations. Figure 4 summarizes the main quantitative results of our paper. The
left panel displays the change in thebetween-group variance of log-consumption implied by both
models as well as the data. The right panel does the same for the within-group variance of log-
consumption, our main focus of interest. Since sum of the between- and within-group variance
of consumption equals the overall variance, the changein theoverall variance from the data and
both models can be readily deduced from the two panels.
Since the change in between group income inequality is modeled by a deterministic process,
by construction thereisno (self-)insurancepossibleagainst theincreaseinbetween-groupincome
variability. Thus in the long-run all of the increase in between-group income inequality is
re‡ected in a one-for-one increase in between-group consumption inequality in both models.
It is therefore not surprising that both models have nearly identical predictions for that part of
consumption inequality. The fact, shown in panel (a) of …gure 2, that in the data the increase
in between-group income inequality is similar to the increase in between-group consumption
inequality implies that the increase in between-group inequality predicted by both models is
similar to the one observed in the data.
The crucial di¤erencebetween the two models arethe…nancial instruments that can beused
to (self-)insure idiosyncratic income risk, the borrowing limits that constrain the use of these
instrumentsaswell asthechangeoftheselimitsovertime. Thusthecrucial quantitativequestion
ishow well both modelscan capturethetrend in within-group consumptioninequality. Theright
panel ofFigure 4 answers this question. It shows that, for our benchmark parameterization, the
DCMmodel understatesand theSIM model overstatestheincreasein within-group consumption
21Since the other statistics are determined exclusively from the production side of the economy, changes in ¹ B
or rb do not require re-calibration of A;®; ±:
27inequality, compared to the data. While the data displays an increase in the variance of about
2:0% theDCM model shows an increaseofonly 0:5%, whereas the standard incomplete markets
model predictsanincreaseof4:5%; compared to thedata.22 To put thesenumbersin perspective,
note that the increase in within-group income variance from the data and fed into the models
is 11%: Thus both models are successful in generating an increase in within-group consumption
inequality substantially lower than for income inequality, in line with the data.
The empirical evidence of increasing between-group consumption inequality and increasing
within-group consumption inequality also speaks against the standard complete markets model.
That model, by allowing perfect consumption insurance between and within groups, counter-
factually predicts that between-group, within-group and total consumption inequality should
remain completely unchanged over time.
The quantitative di¤erence in the change of within-group consumption inequality in the two
models is due to the di¤erential response of consumer credit to increased income volatility. In
the SIM model the increase in the variance of income leads to higher precautionary savings.
In addition, households facing larger shocks become more hesitant to borrow, plus their ability
to borrow remains unchanged. Thus outstanding unsecured consumer credit (as a fraction of
output) declines by 0:6%, equilibrium asset holdings and thus the physical capital stock increase
by 2:1% and the real return on capital declines by 17 basis points. In contrast, in the DCM
model credit limits expand for the purchase of all Arrow securities, and households can and
do borrow more, at least against the contingency of having higher income tomorrow. This is
re‡ected in an increase in outstanding unsecured consumer credit (again as a fraction ofoutput)
by 2:1%: But to keep consumption as smooth as before the change in the income process may
requirea bigger expansion in borrowing than is feasiblewith the new, wider constraints, so some
of the increase in income volatility is re‡ected in consumption: the within-group consumption
variance increases, albeit only very mildly. The expansion of credit in the DCM model is met
by an increase in purchases of Arrow securities, as households have a stronger need to save for
thecontingency of being income-poor tomorrow. On net, aggregate savings and thus the capital
22Note that, combining both panels, the overall increase in consumption inequality in the data is, even in a
quantitative sense, almost perfectly matched by the DCM model. But since this is due to the fact that this model
overstates the increase in between-group consumption inequality and understates the increase in within-group
consumption inequality, we do not want to stress this …nding. On the other hand, the SIM model overstates both
components of inequality and thus the extent of the overall increase in consumption inequality.
28stock increases, by 1:8% and the return on capital falls by 15 basis points. The increase in the
capital stock and the declinein the interest rateis smaller, compared to theSIM model, because
the increase in asset accumulation in the debt constraint model is partially o¤set by a higher
demand for credit, an e¤ect that is absent in the SIM model. A precise quantitative evaluation
of both models with respect to the CE data along the credit dimension is not possible as data
on unsecured consumer credit isnot available in our CE sample. At least qualitatively, however,
the DCM model seems to be more consistent with recent developments in US credit markets
(see also our …gure 7 in the conclusion).
6.2 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we document how sensitive our main …ndings are to changes in the tightness of
the borrowing constraints and the high persistence of the income shock. Finally we assess the
performance of a “hybrid” model that inherit elements of both the SIM and DCM model.
6.2.1 Borrowing Constraints
In Table 2 we report results for di¤erent values of the borrowing constraint for the SIM model.
We normalized the production function in such a way that, in the initial steady state, average
wages equal to 1: Thus a borrowing constraint of B = 2 implies that a household can take out
(noncollateralized) loans up to twice her annual average labor income. We also document how
our resultsfor the DCM model changeif wereducethenet real interest rateat which households
can save in autarky to zero, making the default option less attractive. The statistics we report
are the change, between 1980 and 2003, in the within-group consumption (in logs) variance, the
change in the outstanding credit to GDP ratio and the change in the real interest rate.
29Table 2. Change in Borrowing Constraints
Economy ¢Var ¢Credit ¢r
SIM, B =0 0.0456 0% -0.20%
SIM, B =1 0.0454 -0.62% -0.17%
SIM, B =2 0.0463 -0.88 -0.15%
DCM, rd = 4% 0.0049 2.05% -0.15%
DCM, rd = 0% 0.0012 12.34% -0.03%
Themost important observation from Table2 isthat moregenerous credit lines perse, ifthey
don’t change over time, do not help keeping theincrease in within-group consumption inequality
low in the SIM model. For this result, the existence of capital as an asset in positive net supply
is crucial. Since the wealth-to-output ratio is calibrated to 2:6 in the model, most households
are far to the right from the borrowing constraint in the wealth distribution. In addition, with
highly persistent income shocks they are very reluctant to obtain credit in response to bad
income shocks. In fact, as these shocks become bigger over time, households become even more
timid in using credit and try to stay away from high debt positions. We observe from the table
that credit-to-GDP ratio declines with the increase in income volatility, the more so the looser
the borrowing constraint and thus the higher the debt position of those at the constraint.
For the DCM model, reducing the interest rate at which people can save after default leads
to a worse autarkic option, and thus to more borrowing being enforceable. In fact, with an
rd =¡2% (i.e. householdscan saveonly at a negativereal interest rateof2%); thedefault option
is so unattractive that perfect risk sharing is possible and the predictions of the DCM model
collapsetothoseofthestandardcompletemarketsmodel. Reducing theautarkicsavingsinterest
rate not only gives rise to better risk allocation in the initial steady state, but to a stronger
relaxation ofborrowing constraints over time. Asa result, theuse ofcredit expands substantially
and there is almost no increase in within-group consumption inequality over time, reducing the
ability of the DCM model to match the data, relative to thebenchmark parameterization. Also
note that with rd = 0%; the increase in credit demand almost matches the increased savings
demand, sothat thereal interest rateand thecapital stock remainvirtually unchanged asincome
variability increases.
306.2.2 Persistence of Income Shocks
At least since Friedman (1957) it is well-understood that very persistent income shocks are
harderto self-insureagainst than incomeshocks that are transitory in nature. Ouridiosyncratic
income process is the sum of a highly persistent and a purely transitory component. While
authors that estimate this process from wage data consistently …nd the persistence parameter ½
close to 1; some disagreement exists about its exact magnitude. We have repeated our analysis
for various other choices of ½ and report, in Table 3, results for ½ =0:8; the value estimated by
Guvenen (2005), which is the lowest estimate for ½ we areaware of; for the exact income process
we use.23 In each case we re-calibrate theincome process and timediscount factor such that the
cross-sectional income dispersion of the process fed into the model matches the empirical facts
from Figure 4, and the initial real return on capital remains at 4%: This procedure keeps the
volatility of the income process unchanged, but reduces its persistence.
Table 3. Change in Persistence: ½ =0:8
Economy ¢Var ¢Credit ¢r
SIM, B =0 0.0355 0% -0.28%
SIM, B =1 0.0334 -0.01% -0.22%
SIM, B =2 0.0341 0.0% -0.19%
DCM, rd = 4% 0.0025 1.33% -0.10%
DCM, rd = 2:5% 0.0013 3.93% -0.04%
Comparing the results of Table 3 with those in Table 2 we see that a lower persistence of
income shocks in the standard incomplete markets model indeed reduces the rise in within-
group consumption inequality. While for ½ = 0:9989 this increase rise was about 4:5%; with
a ½ = 0:8 it drops to about 3:4% (compared to 2% in the data). Again the results are fairly
independent of the borrowing constraint. With lower persistence households in the standard
incomplete markets model …nd it easier to self-insure by accumulating capital and using it to
smooth income shocks. The increase in the capital stock (and corresponding decline in the
23The ½ = 0:8 is the lowest estimate reported in his table 1. Heaton and Lucas (1996) estimate a simple AR(1)
process, that is, they do not have an independent purely transitory shock. Thus, if the true process is the one we
use, their estimated ½ = 0:53 is a downward biased estimate of the true autoregressive coe¢cient.
We also repeated our exercises with a ½ = 0:95; the value reported by Storesletten et al. (1998). The results,
available upon request, are quite similar to those for ½ = 0:9989:
31real return) is more pronounced for ½ = 0:8 than for ½ = 0:9989: Also, households now are
not as timid as before using credit to smooth income shocks; instead of a decline of credit as
a fraction of GDP we now observe this statistic to be virtually unchanged. We conclude that
setting persistence of the income shocks to the lower bound from the empirical literature leads
to a lesser increase of within-group consumption inequality in the SIM model. Still, that model
somewhat overstates the increase observed in the data.
In theDCM model, a lower ½ reduces thevalue ofautarky for households with currently high
income, whoseconstraintsarebinding, becauseit is now less likely that they remain income-rich.
Thus, ceteris paribus, the implications of the DCM model are closer to those of the complete
markets model. In fact, for ½ = 0:8 any autarkic interest rate below 2% leads to complete
consumption insurance. Thus while the results for this persistence are not identical to the
complete markets model, they are quantitatively close, making the model’s understatement of
the increase in within-group consumption inequality more severe
6.2.3 Market Completeness or Endogenous Borrowing Constraints?24
There are two main di¤erences between our DCM model and the SIM model. First, our model
features a full set of Arrow securities and second, borrowing constraints adjust endogenously
to changes in the income process. To evaluate whether introducing time-varying borrowing
constraints in the SIM model helps to bring that models’ predictions closer to the data we now
present results for a “hybrid” model. This model, named after Zhang (1997), retains themarket
structure of the SIM model in that agents can only trade a risk-free, uncontingent bond. The
borrowing constraint, however, is now allowed to vary over time: agents can borrow up to the
maximum amount such that, in all possible states tomorrow, they are at least weakly better o¤
repaying their debt rather than defaulting and living in autarky from thereon.
The crucial lesson from Table 4 is that introducing time-dependent borrowing constraints
into theSIM model, at least in theway proposedby Zhang(1997), doesnot alterthequantitative
implications of the model with respect to the change in within-group consumption inequality.
It does, however, enable the model to reproduce the empirically observed increase in the use of
credit.
24We thank Pierre Olivier Gourinchas for helpful discussions leading to this subsection.
32Table 4. A Hybrid Model
Economy ¢Var ¢Var0 ¢Credit ¢r
SIM, ½ =0:9989; B =1 0.0454 0.0095 -0.62% -0.17%
Zhang, ½ =0:9989 0.0469 -0.0112 1.7% -0.16%
DCM, ½ =0:9989;rd = 4% 0.0049 0.0015 2.05% -0.15%
SIM, ½ =0:8;B =1 0.0334 0.0049 -0.01% -0.22%
Zhang, ½ =0:8 0.0348 -0.0154 1.6% -0.22%
DCM, ½ =0:8;rd = 4% 0.0025 0.0007 1.33% -0.10%
To explain the driving forces behind these results Table 4 reports not only the change in
within-consumption inequality between the …rst and last period of the income transition (the
column labeled ¢Var), but also the change between the initial steady state and the …rst period
of the transition (the column labeled ¢Var0). Households, on impact, respond very di¤er-
ently to the unexpected change in the income process in the Zhang economy, compared to the
standard incomplete markets economy. In the Zhang economy credit lines expand on impact,
and households make use of these expanded credit lines. As a result, consumption inequality
initially falls. But this comes at the price that now households that have borrowed more face
higher debt levels and income processes with more extreme realizations. Over time, the debt
needs to be serviced, consumption has to respond and consumption inequality eventually goes
up (about …ve periods after impact). After 25 years the change in consumption inequality is the
same as in the benchmark SIM model.25 Thus borrowing constraints that are relaxed over time
help households in the short run to better smooth more volatile income ‡uctuations, but in the
long run their debt burden catches up with them. As a result, consumption inequality does not
increase in the short run but does so eventually, to the same extent as in the standard model.
Why doesn’t the same logic apply in the DCM model? Here is where the second feature
of that model, state contingent borrowing comes in. In the DCM model it is households with
currently high income that enter theperiod with high debt, exactly becausethey have borrowed
against the contingency of being income-rich. Thus the high debt is not such a high burden and
25Another way to explain this is to note that with highly persistent shocks an increase in the variance of
these shocks leads to an increase in the cross-sectional variance of permanent income of comparable magnitude,
something that Bowlus and Robin (2004) argue occurred empirically in the US. Notsurprisingly a higher dispersion
of permanent income eventually leads to a larger dispersion in consumption in the SIM model.
33householdscan and do makeuseofthehighercredit lineswithout theconsequenceofparticularly
low consumption in the future. In sharp contrast, in the SIM model it is income-poor people
that start the period with outstanding credit (because of the strong positive correlation of
income and the fact that they went into debt because of bad income realizations). Thus in that
model highly indebted households eventually have to accept (persistently) low consumption.
Put another way, in the SIM assets and income are highly positively correlated, whereas in the
DCM they are negatively correlated. Therefore in one model being in debt has fairly persistent
negative consequences for consumption, in the other model it has not.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we use CE survey data to document that the increase in income inequality for
the US in the last 25 years has not been accompanied by a substantial increase in consump-
tion inequality. We propose a theory that provides a simple explanation for this observation.
If the increase in income inequality has been, at least partially, driven by an increase in idio-
syncratic labor income risk, then the value households place on access to formal and informal
credit and insurance mechanisms rises, and the scope of these mechanisms may endogenously
broaden. Individual consumption may then bebetter insulated against (higher) incomerisk and
cross-sectional consumption inequality may increase only mildly. If, however, the structure of
private …nancial markets and informal insurance arrangements does not to respond to changes
in the underlying stochastic income process of individuals, then no further hedging against the
increasing risk is possible and the increase in income inequality leads to a more pronounced rise
in consumption inequality.
The mechanism through which agents in the DCM model of the last section keep their
consumption pro…les stable in the light of more volatile income, is an expansion in the use of
non-collateralized credit. Did this expansion take place in the data? One simple (but of course
only partial) measure of credit available and used by US consumers is the ratio of aggregate
unsecured consumer credit to disposable income. In Figure 6 we plot this ratio from US data
for the last 40 years, as well as the Gini coe¢cient for US household income.26 Despite some
26The series for consumer credit is from the 2005 Economic Report of the President, table B77. It only includes
revolving consumer credit which is entirely unsecured. The series is available from 1968. Personal disposable
34idiosyncratic cyclical variations the two series display a remarkably similar trend. Combining
this …gure with our consumption inequality observations may suggest that consumers could and
in fact did make stronger useofcredit markets exactly when they needed to (starting in the mid
1970’s) in orderto insulateconsumption from biggerincome ‡uctuations. Wewant to stressthat
we view the expansion of credit lines in the DCM model as a metaphor for the expansion of a
variety of formal and informal risk sharing mechanisms, with formal credit being an important,
but by no means the only component.
Both models evaluated in this paper have their shortcomings. The DCM model hypothesizes
very well-developed, maybe too developed direct insurance markets. While the complete set
of Arrow securities can be interpreted to stand in for the host of assets traded in …nancial
markets and forinformal insurancemechanismsworking on thelevel oftheextendedfamily, some
may question the empirical realism of this assumption, which is important for our results, as
demonstrated in thelast section. Thismodel is consistent with theempirically observed increase
in credit and the only slight increase in consumption inequality over time, but it overstates the
degree to which individual consumption is insulated from income shocks and understates the
response of within-group consumption inequality to increased income volatility. On the other
hand, the SIM model may have a more realistic market structure, but seems to allow somewhat
too little explicit insurance against income shocks, over and above simple self-insurance. In
our application it therefore overstates the level and the increase in within-group consumption
inequality. It also does not display an increase in the use of uncollateralized credit over time,
unless more ‡exible borrowing constraints are introduced. In their work Blundell et al. (2002)
and Storesletten et al. (2004) come to the same qualitative conclusion.
Conditional on these …ndings we conjecture that a model that, as the DCM, has an endoge-
nous evolution of credit markets but that, unlike the DCM, restricts the insurance possibilities
available to agents (possibly restricting the spanning of the insurance contracts) might be even
more empirically successful in matching the data. Further empirical work using micro data may
inform us how to more precisely model the mechanisms that households can use to smooth out
idiosyncratic income shocks. We defer this to ongoing and future research.
income is obtained from the same source, table B30. The Gini index for household income is available, starting
in 1967, from the US Census Bureau Historical Income Tables, Table H4.
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39Appendix
A Data Description
In this appendix we provide a detailed description of the income and consumption data we use
in the paper.
A.1 CE Files and Observations
Our data comes from the CE interview surveys 1980 through 2003 (which contains also data
for the …rst quarter of 2004) provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Consumption
expenditure data is from the Family Characteristics and Income (FAMILY) …les except for the
year 1982 and 1983 in which the FAMILY …les do not contain consumption information. For
those years we obtain consumption data from the Detailed Expenditures (MTAB) Files. Note
that theconsumption informationintheFAMILY …lesisjust anaggregation oftheinformation in
theMTAB …les. Incomedata arefrom theFAMILY …leand hoursworkedby household members
(used to construct wages) are from the Member Characteristics and Income (MEMBER) …les.
An observation in our data set consists of all the information collected in a given interview for
a given household (identi…ed by a unique ID number). Each household is present in no more
than 4 observations.
A.2 Consumption Categories
In table A1 we report all the categories of consumption expenditures we use, together with
the BLS price index we use to de‡ate them. Categories 1 through 20 are reported directly in
the CE for every observation while we derived categories 21 and 22 as described below. Our
de…nition ofND consumption (used in table 1) includes categories 1 through 13. Ourmeasureof
ND+consumption includes ND consumption, categories 20 and 21 plus categories14 though 18.
These latter categories contain expenditures on durable goods, but since we do not have enough
information to compute imputed services from those durables we simply include expenditures.
Finally our de…nition of total consumption expenditures (used in table 1) includes categories 1
through 20. We now describe in more detail some of the categories.
A.2.1 Food Expenditure Correction
A change in survey methodology (see Battistin (2003) for details) causes a sizeable (about 15%)
systematic downward bias in reported food expenditures for all the observations in the years
1982-1987. In order to correct for this bias weregressthe log offood expenditurefor all yearson
a quadratic time trend, on quadratics in income and total non-food consumption expenditures,
on weeksworked, on a completeset ofhousehold characteristics(including age, education, region
of residence, family composition), on a dummy for the period 1982-87 and on interactions term
40of the dummy with all other independent variables. We then use the regression coe¢cients to
scale up food expenditures for every observation in the period 1982-87.
A.2.2 Services from Vehicles
Each CE observation contains reports of expenditures for purchases of new and used vehicles.
The CE also reports the number of cars owned by the household in that quarter. For each year
we …rst select all observations that report positive expenditures for vehicle purchases, and run
a regression of these expenditures on quadratics in income and total non-vehicle consumption
expenditures, weeks worked by household members, expenditures on gasoline, expenditures on
public transportation, vehicle maintenance expenditures, the number of cars owned, a complete
set of household characteristics (including age, education, region of residence, family composi-
tion) plus quarter dummies. These regressions have an R2 that ranges from 74% to 94% in our
sample years. On average, in every year a little more than 10% of households report positive
expenditureon vehicles. Weuse the estimated regression coe¢cients to predict expenditures for
vehicles for all households in that year (i.e. for those who did and for those who did not report
positive vehicle expenditures). Our measure of consumption services from vehicles then is the
predicted expenditures on vehicles, times the number of cars the consumer unit owns, times 1
32
(re‡ecting the assumption of average complete depreciation of a vehicle after 32 quarters).
A.2.3 Services from Primary Residence
Each observation in the CE provides information on whether the household rents or owns its
primary residence. Ifthehouseholdsrentswemeasurehousingservicesastherent paid, including
insurance and other out-of-pocket expenses paid by the renter. To impute housing services for
those household that own we use a variable from the CE that measures the market rent (as
estimated by the reference person of the consumer unit) the residence would command if rented
out. This variable is not available for all years of the sample, in particular not for the years
1980-81 and 1993-94; Thus in order to compute this variable in a uniform way across our
sample we use an imputation procedure similar to the one used for vehicles. For the year for
which we have the reported market rent of the unit we regressed it on self-reported property
values, quadratics in income and total non-housing consumption expenditures, a complete set
of household characteristics (including age, education, region of residence, family composition)
plus quarter dummies. Since property values are only reported by a subset of the homeowners
we allow the coe¢cient of the regression to be di¤erent for those who reported the property
value and for those who do not. These regressions have an R2 that ranges from 30% to 55% in
our sample years We then use estimated regression coe¢cients to predict rental value of owned
properties for all the home owners. For the years 1980-81 we use the coe¢cient estimated in
1982, and for the years 1993-94 we use the coe¢cients estimated in 1995. For the years 1982-
1992 and 1995-2003 we have both the actual and the imputed rental equivalent of the owned
home, so we computed the trends in consumption inequality using housing services computed
in both ways. The resulting trends are extremely similar.
41A.3 Sample Selection
We …rst exclude observations for which there is clear evidence of measurement error. In par-
ticular we exclude observations classi…ed as incomplete income respondents, observations which
report zero food expenditure for the quarter, those who report only food expenditures for the
quarter and those who report positive labor income, but no hours worked. We then exclude
all observations with an age of the household head below 21 or above 64, and negative or zero
LEA+ earnings. In our benchmark sample we also exclude observations with weekly wages of
the reference person below half of the minimum wage, households classi…ed as rural, and those
households which have not completed the full set of 4 interviews.
A.4 Aggregation and Top-Coding
Inequality measures arecomputed on annual cross sections. We assign an observation to a given
year if the last interview of that household is completed between April of that year and March
of the following year. Whenever incomeorconsumption expenditures aretop-coded we set them
to their top-coding thresholds. We have experimented with increasing the values of top-coded
income/consumption components (multiplying the threshold by 1.5); inequality measures are
robust to these changes, as in general the number of observation with top-coded income or
consumption …gures never exceeds 2% in a given quarter.
A.5 Data Availability
Our data set in Stata format, including a brief documentation is available at
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~fperri/research_data.htm
B Recursive Formulation and Computational Algorithm
Here we formulate the consumer problem for the DCM model recursively and provide a sketch
of the algorithm used to compute a stationary equilibrium. In the nonstationary case (that is,
along the transition) the logic remains the same but all functions have to be indexed by t: For
simplicity here we omit the distinction by types and lump into y the transitory and persistent
incomeshocks. Theequilibrium problemis nonstandard as oneneeds to solvenot only forprices,
but also for endogenous borrowing constraints. We …rst compute the value of autarky as the
…xed point to the functional equation
UAut(y;b) = max
c;b0¸0
0
@(1 ¡¯)u(b+y ¡
b0
1+rd) +¯
X
y02Y
¼(y0jy)UAut(y0;b0)
1
A
We then guess the risk free rate R = 1=q: No arbitrage implies that the prices of the Arrow
securities q(y0jy) are a function of our guess and given by q¼(y0jy). We guess borrowing con-
straints Ai(y0) and solve the consumer problem, taking these borrowing constraints Ai(y0) and
42prices for Arrow securities q¼(y0jy) as given:
V(y; a) = max
c;fa0(y0)gy02Y
8
<
:(1 ¡¯)u(c) +¯
X
y02Y
¼(y0jy)V(i; a0(y0);y0)
9
=
;
s.t.
c +
X
y02Y
q(y0jy)a0(y0) = ®iy +a a0 ¸Ai(y0):
We …nally check whether the borrowing constraints are not too tight by asking whether
V(y0; Ai(y0)) = UAut(y0; 0)
for all y0: If the equalities hold, then we have solved for the borrowing constraints associated
with the guessed interest rate, if not, we update the guesses for Ai(y0) until all equalities hold.
Once wefound the borrowing constraints that are not “too tight” we use the associated optimal
asset policies a0(y; a; y0) together with the transition probabilities ¼ to de…ne the operator H
that maps current measures over wealth and income shocks into tomorrow’s measures. We then
computethe(unique) …xed point oftheoperator H anddenoteit by ©: Given © and theoptimal
consumption policies we can check the market clearing conditions. If market clearing holds we
have found a stationary equilibrium, if not we update our guess of the interest rate R = 1
q:
We implement this procedure numerically by approximating value and policy functions with
piece-wise linear functions over the state space. For more details on the basic algorithm and on
the theoretical characterization of the stationary equilibrium, see Krueger and Perri (1999).
43Table A1. Consumption Categories and Deflators
Number Category CPI used to deflate
a
Non Durable Expenditures
1 Food Food SAF1
2 Alcoholic beverages Alcholic beverages SAF116
3 Tobacco Tobacco and Smoking products SEGA
4 Personal Care Personal care SAG1
5 Fuels, Utilities and Public services Fuels and utilities SAH2
6 Household operations Household Furnishings and Operations SAH3
7 Public Transportation Public Transportation SETG
8 Gasoline and Motor Oil Motor Fuels SETB
9 Apparel Apparel SAA
10 Education Tuition Expenditures SEEB
11 Reading Recreational Reading Material SERG
12 Health Services Medical care SAM
13 Miscellaneous Expenditures 
b Miscellaneous Personal Services SEGD
Other Expenditures
14 Entertainment Entertainment
c SA6
15 Household Equipment Household Furnishings and Operations SAH3
16 Other Lodging Expenses
d Shelter SAH1
17 Other Vehicle Expenses
e Car Maintenance and Repair SETD
18 Rented Dwellings Rent of Primary residence SEHA
19 Owned Dwellings Shelter SAH1
20 Purchases of vehicles Purchase of new vehicles SETA01
Imputed Services
21 Services from owned primary residence Rent of Primary residence SEHA
22 Services from vehicles Purchase of new vehicles SETA01
Notes
a) The CPI are monthly average city data for all urban consumers, not seasonally adjusted and they are in base 1982-984=100
b) These are mostly fee for services such us banking or legal assistance
c) The BLS CPI for enteteinment ends in 1998. We extend it to 2004 using the CPI for recreation (SAR)
d) It includes mostrly expenditures on vacation homes
e) It includes expenditures on maintenance, repairs, insurance and  finance charges
BLS CPI CodeTable A2. Summary Statistics for the Benchmark Sample
Year Households Average Income
LEA+ ND ND+
1980 638 15736 7447 12940
1981 1439 15419 7348 12875
1982 1313 16453 6949 12605
1983 1700 16746 7134 12873
1984 1771 18017 7398 13495
1985 1267 17862 7323 13463
1986 748 18678 7308 13725
1987 1840 19318 7558 13992
1988 1621 18881 7391 13752
1989 1762 19585 7517 14183
1990 1789 18893 7455 14171
1991 1749 19170 7376 13858
1992 1725 19046 7126 13737
1993 1786 18841 7115 13686
1994 1744 18657 7114 13498
1995 1325 19269 7127 13865
1996 881 20203 7433 14674
1997 1609 20557 7203 14204
1998 1578 20952 7323 14689
1999 1763 22060 7263 14532
2000 2164 21508 7191 14508
2001 2227 21468 6967 14060
2002 2387 23427 7280 14766
2003 2593 22544 7053 14359
Note: Income and consumption measures are in 1982-84 constant dollars per adult equivalent. 
Averages are weighted using CE population weights. An household belongs  to year x if
its fifth interview is between the second quarter of year x and the first quarter of the year x+1
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Figure 1. The Evolution of Income and Consumption Inequality in the US, 1980-2003
Gini Index
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
2
3
4
5
6
7
Year
90/10 Ratio
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
1.5
2
2.5
3
50/10 Ratio
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Variance of Logs
ND+ Consumption LEA+ Income 2SE Bands
Note: The standard errors are computing using a bootstrap procedure with 100 repetitions
 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
f
r
o
m
 
1
9
8
0
 
v
a
l
u
e
Year
Figure 2. Changes in between and within-group Income and Consumption Inequality
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Figure 3. Characterizing the link between Income and Consumption Dispersion
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Figure 4. Income Variances: Data and Models
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Note: The solid line represent the cross sectional variances estimated in the data.
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Figure 5. Changes in Between and Within-group Consumption Inequality: Data and Models
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Figure 6. Income Inequality and Consumer Credit
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